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LIBERALISM LOST
THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE. By Stanley Fish. 1
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1999. 328
pp. $14.95.
Daniel A. Farbel

In his latest book, Stanley Fish attacks liberal political
1
theory in general and First Amendment theory in particular. To
read this book is not merely to encounter a critique of liberalism
but to confront Fish himself, as a forceful polemical presence. In
his earlier writings about literary theory, Fish observed that the
4
reader actively participates in bringing a work to life. In that
spirit, what follows is a reader's encounter with The Trouble with
Principle and with the "author"- not the real human being
whose picture appears on the back cover, but the author who
emerges from the text itself.
Imagine then a room at twilight. A balding man with
an intense look sits in a leather chair next to a reading
lamp. From the shadows, a voice is heard. As the dialogue proceeds, the shadows gradually darken. (Italicized passages within the dialogue are quotations from
The Trouble with Principle.)
Reader: Hello, Dean Fish. May I call you Stanley? I feel as
if I know you, which I suppose in a sense I do, since you're the

I. Dean of College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Illinois at Chicago.
2. Henry J. Fletcher Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty and Research,
University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to thank Jim Chen, Dianne Farber,
David McGowan, Mike Paulsen, and Suzanna Sherry for helpful criticisms.
3. "Liberal" here, by the way, refers to philosophical liberalism, which includes
everyone from Richard Epstein and Robert Nozick, to Frank Michclman and John
Rawls.
4. The "reader response" theory is applied to Milton in Stanley Fish, Surprised by
Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost (Harvard U. Press, 1996), and developed more gcner·
ally in Stanley Fish, Is There A Text In This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Com·
munities 21-67 (Harvard U. Press, 1980).
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authorial voice I've drawn from the text. There's a lot I agree
with in your views: our need to act morally despite unresolvable
uncertainties, your call for a pragmatic approach to the First
Amendment, and your skepticism that political philosophy can
provide much help in resolving hard questions. But I find your
prose style a little off-putting-as if I had been cornered at a
party by a very interesting person who is also very loud and unrelenting. There's also a lot of what you say that I find puzzling- which is partly Minnesotan for saying that I strongly disagree and partly a reflection of genuine puzzlement. I thought
maybe we could start by discussing the relationship between
theory and practice, which is one aspect of your thought that I
honestly don't understand.
Stanley: I've always believed that theory had nothing to do
with practice. Theory is just the professional practice of theorists, which has nothing to do with the rest of life. The truth is
that neither the benefits nor the troubles of professional practices
come along with us when we leave their precincts and enter another. (p. 302) So my years of work on Milton changed my Milton scholarship but otherwise were completely irrelevant to my
life. True, I was a Milton scholar by profession, but that meant
only that I had the kind of understanding [that] qualifies one to
be an authority on Milton .... [W]hen I did decide about what
Milton believed, the decision led me not to live my life differently
than I had before but to interpret Milton differently than I had before. (p. 273)
Reader: You're speaking in the past tense. Did something
change?
Stanley: Yes, not that long ago. My own thoughts ... coalesce around a moment in a Milton seminar I taught several years
ago. The students were discoursing glibly (as my example had instructed them) about some matter or other-the intricacies of
Milton's verse, or the import of his allusions to Virgil-and I
without thinking burst out "No, no, he doesn't want your admiration; he wants your soul!" Was this a professional comment? ...
Had something happened to me of which I was only dimly aware?
Was I in danger (or in hope) of no longer being an authority and
becoming something else? God only knows. (p. 275)
Reader: I found that a very dramatic, intriguing passagel'm glad you included it in the book. I do wonder if you've
worked through its implications completely. Have you noticed
any changes in yourself since then?
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Stanley: Yes, my speech patterns seem to have changed. As
you know, I'm the world's leading Milton expert, but now I can't
seem to stop quoting his poetry, even when the subject is something seemingly unrelated like contemporary First Amendment
scholarship or liberal political theory.
Reader: As a layperson, I found the references interesting
though sometimes difficult to follow. Sometimes, though,
bringing in Milton worked wonderfully. For example, I loved it
where you compared philosophical inquiry to "Milton's fallen
angels who try to reason about fate, foreknowledge, and free will
and find themselves 'in wandering mazes lost."' (p. 63) Very
nice!
Stanley: Yes, but my Milton-mania may be a bit out of control. Here's an example. I discuss a First Amendment scholar
named Rod Smolla and comment that some of his phrases don't
seem to fit the logic of the First Amendment but instead seem to
represent meaningless fragments of a different morality. Of
course that reminds me of a passage from Milton. Smolla calls
to mind a fallen angel. Particularly, the inability of the fallen angels ... to produce sentences that do not fall apart in their mouths.
Having severed their connection with the only source of value in
the universe, they are reduced to saying things like we are "Surer
to prosper than prosperity I Could have assur'd us ... " (p. 78)
Smolla is just as incoherent. It would be as hard put to assign a
meaning to "sure" or "prosperity" in Satan's utterance as we are
to assign meaning ... [to] Smolla's. (p. 78)
Reader: Apart from the fact that you're drawing on Milton,
I notice that you seem to verge on demonizing the opposition
there. At least indirectly, you seem to be comparing traditional
First Amendment scholars and their utterances to Satan. (When
I write this up, I wonder if I can work in a reference to Rushdie's
Satanic Verses here.) Is the theological comparison apt?
Stanley: The similarity runs very deep, as you can see from
Paradise Lost. The First Amendment demands disinterested
judgment about the permissibility of speech, but truly disinterested judgment is an impossibility: judgment without partialityjudgment delivered from nowhere and everywhere-is not an option for human beings and is available only to Gods and machines. The strong First Amendment promise is the promise that
Satan made to Adam and Eve, that we shall be as Gods. . . . (p.
113)
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Reader: But even if they're wrong, don't you think that First
Amendment scholars might have a reasonable point of view?
Stanley: "Listen to both sides" -what an empty platitude. I
know that a lot of people think that the very existence of opponents who are as well-educated and (in most things) as sensible as
oneself is a reason for relaxing the aggressiveness of one's polemical assertions-the logic is "Maybe they know something I don't
know" or "Maybe God knows something neither of us knows"but if it is a reason for anything, it is a reason for wonder at the
persistence of error, even on the part of those who have had all the
educational advantages.
That there is resistance by wellcredentialed persons to your own views is a (regrettable) political
fact from which no moral or normative conclusions follows, unless of course among the resisters are some whose words and
writings you regard as holy writ. (p. 290)
Reader: Wow, I wish I were that self-confident! Your view
of the First Amendment seems to mirror your attitude toward
academic debate in an interesting way. I don't know whether to
think that you're projecting your own adversarial personality on
the world at large or whether you're being admirably coherent in
unifying your own scholarly style, your personality, and your
general theories. But I'm also not sure how serious you are
about this "talking as warfare" thing. You really don't think you
might be able to learn something from a dialogue with those on
the other side?
Stanley: The idea of learning something from the other side
is one of the fallacies I've tried to expose. [N]arrow partialities ... will always inform the activities of human actors. And by
the same reasoning, communication is not a vehicle for harmonizing those partialities-not, as Habermas would have it be, a
cooperative venture. Rather, it is a competitive one, and the prize
in the competition is the (temporary) right to label your way of
talking "undistorting," a label you can claim only until some other
way of talking, some other vocabulary elaborated with a superior
force, takes it away from you. (p. 306) By the way, have I mentioned how much I detest Habermas? As far as I am concerned,
any positive reference to Habermas in the course of an argument
is enough to invalidate it. (p. 122)
Reader: I guess I'll let Habermas defend himself. Don't go
away, though, I promise not to include any positive references to
him in this dialogue. You seem to view communication as ad-
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versarial. It's understandable, given your view of communication, that you don't believe in the marketplace of ideas.
Stanley: The marketplace of ideas is an abomination. It
leaves decisions up to everyone and therefore no one. [B]ecause
none of us is a god some of us must decide, lest the imperatives of
the mora/life be given over to forces-called the marketplace of
ideas-that are accountable to no one and bound to no vision except the antivision of chance and random fate. (p. 92)
Reader: But shouldn't people be willing to put their ideas
forward to be criticized and assessed? That kind of free debate
is what is captured by the marketplace metaphor.
Stanley: Free debate isn't necessarily a bad value, but it's a
value like any other. There is no reason to expect everyone to
share it. In fact, it's mostly a value held by people who don't
have any strong substantive convictions and therefore don't care
much about winning or losing. The world looks quite different
to someone with powerful convictions, most notably to the true
religious believer. To put the matter baldly, a person of religious
conviction should not want to enter the marketplace of ideas but
to shut it down, at least insofar as it presumes to determine matters
that he believes have been determined by God and faith. The religious person should not seek an accommodation with liberalism;
he should seek to rout it from the field. (p. 250) Religion can't
really compete in the so-called marketplace with secular ideas
because they are based on entirely different ways of looking at
the world. It is a tenet of liberal Enlightenment faith that belief
and knowledge are distinct and separable and that even if you do
not embrace a point of view, you can still understand it. This is
the credo Satan announces in Paradise Regained . . . . (p. 247)
Reader (aside): I gather that one of his objections to free
speech is that it's relativist. As Stanley says somewhere, saying
all viewpoints are alike is akin to the mentality that finds no difference between wearing rings on your finger and inserting rings
into your penis. (p. 28) But I wonder whether requiring a particular actor-the government-to remain neutral is really the
same as moral relativism?.... Enough of substance-back to
style!
Reader: "[T]he credo Satan announces in Paradise Regained." (p. 247) Old Scratch seems to come up quite a bit in
your discussions. (Actually, I'm beginning to wonder whether
your position is postmodern or pre-modern.) You were talking
about the role of the truly religious, or I assume others with
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strong substantive views. (Or do you consider religion to be a
special case, as you seem to indicate on pages 296 to 297, where
you say religion has the only vocabulary that resists pragmatist
deconstruction?) Shouldn't the religious person be willing to
live in a liberal society, where religion is not a matter of state
mandate?
Stanley: That's the last thing that someone with true religious views would want. He should want an end to the publidprivate split which, by fencing off the arena of political dispute
from substantive determinations of value, assures the continual
deferral and bracketing of value questions. He should want what
Milton wants, a unified conception of life in which the pressure of
first principles is felt and responded to twenty-four hours a day.
(p.253)
Reader: "[W]hat Milton wants." Didn't you just use the
present tense in reference to Milton's views?
Stanley: Yes, I guess I did. Slip of the tongue.
Reader: Very interesting. Milton does seem to be a real
presence in this conversation, doesn't he? I'd bring him in on a
three-way call, but I don't think I could pull it off. (And maybe I
don't need to "bring him in" anyway.) Anyway, you were
speaking about the public/private distinction. What's wrong
with it?
Stanley: What is not allowed religion under the private public
distinction is the freedom to win, the freedom not to be separate
from the state but to inform and shape its every action. (p. 254)
Reader: Again, you don't seem very open to the idea of
dialogue. I'm interested in your tendency to analyze the world
in terms of transcendental battles between radically opposing
forces. Isn't some kind of accommodation, rather than battle to
the death, a possibility in social life? Even for those like the
truly religious, who have powerful viewpoints of their own?
Stanley: Here is what truly religious people would demand:
not the inclusion of religious discourse in a debate no one is allowed to win but the triumph of religious discourse and the silencing of its atheistic opponents. (p. 261) Religion can't compromise any more than God could compromise with Satan.
Reader: So while liberalism purports to be fair, it isn't because it rules out in advance the possibility of a victory by the
other side?
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Stanley: Fairness! [Fjairness-the impartial treatment of all
points of view no matter what their substantive content-is the liberal's virtue; it is liberals who wish to push conflict off the public
stage in favor of a polite and endless conversation in which everyone has his or her say in the confidence that not very much, and
certainly not anything really disturbing, will come of it. (p. 221)
But of course, liberals don't have any real substantive values
anyway. Strong believers, however, have another goal. They
aren't concerned that the conversation continue and display the
widest possible participation; they want the conversation to take a
certain turn and stay there. They don't want to be fair, they want
to be victorious, and they won't have a chance of victory if they
spend their time fighting over title to their opponents' vocabulary.
(p. 221)
Reader: I'm a little confused. Don't religious believers want
fair treatment?
Stanley: They only do if they fall into the trap of liberalism.
In the eyes of a democratically reasonable person, what is owed to
the strong religious believer is fairness, but fairness is not what the
strong religious believer wants; what he wants is a world ordered
in accordance with the faith he lives by and would die for, and liberal democracy (or pragmatism) isn't going to give him that, ever.
(p. 298) Fairness is a liberal canard, a philosophy for those
whose beliefs are weak.
Reader (aside): This is actually beginning to make liberal
theory sound a bit better to me. It sounds to me like, according
to Fish, the religious have no real ground of complaint that they
can raise within liberalism. In other words, they may have no
basis for invoking liberal concepts such as constitutional rights.
So the liberal could be right in saying that restricting socially
dangerous religious practices doesn't violate the constitutional
rights of participants. In response, the participants can say that
they are morally right to act nonetheless and the state is morally
wrong to intercede. But what the participants can't authentically
say, while staying within their own worldview, is that their constitutional rights are being violated, because that is a concept
that only makes sense within liberalism itself. So in fact, the liberal is right to reject their constitutional claim. But does Stanley
really mean what he says about fairness? Let's test this a little
further.
Reader: So you don't think much of fairness either? You
seem to feel that it's a trap devised by these liberal theorists
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whom you are so worried about-a trap you have avoided
somehow or another.
Stanley: Fairness is the virtue that mitigates against winning
(p. 240) That's what's wrong with liberalism. Immorality resides
in the mantras of liberal theory-fairness, impartiality, and mutual respect-all devices for painting the world various shades of
grey. (p. 242)
Reader (aside): The reference to "winning" is interesting.
Stanley mentions somewhere the idea that liberalism could have
a Hobbesian justification, in a world where in fact no one has the
power to "win" but everyone has the collective power to "lose"
by reducing the world to constant warfare. (p. 109) This sounds
to me like a kind of Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which the trick
is to devise ways to maintain cooperative strategies. But I suppose it wouldn't be fair to ask an English professor, even one
who has also been a sometime professor of law, to discuss game
theory. I must make a note, though, to write up the idea of liberalism as a kind of "tit-for-tat" strategy. How rude of me,
though, to keep Stanley waiting while I go off on these tangents.
Reader: Sorry, I was woolgathering. You just said that liberalism was immoral because it was a device for painting the
world in shades of gray. I must say that you don't seem to be
prone to fine gradations yourself.
Stanley: Seeing shades of gray merely weakens one for the
struggle. Shades of gray are never honored in the world of John
Milton, where the only question is whether you stand in the light
with God or in the dark with Satan. (p. 243)
Reader: Milton, again. Sometimes it seems unclear whether
it is our world or Milton's you are discussing. Are we talking
about the 17th century or the dawn of the 21st? Am I talking to
him or to you, I almost wonder. Or is it all the same? Anyway,
you seem to favor Milton's view of religion over those of many
religious people today. But aren't there contemporary religious
views that are compatible with liberal democracy?
Stanley: You could call them religious, I suppose, in some
watered-down sense or another. To be sure, those religions that
put "openness of mind" at the center of their faith-or rather at
the center of their rejection of faith-will be welcomed into the
political process and accorded a role in American public life, but
only because in their stripped down and soft-edged form they are
indistinguishable from other Enlightenment projects and are
hardly religious at all. (p. 189)
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Reader (aside): Is it problematic that he's purporting to decide for other people what it means to be religious? This seems
to make Khomeni the paradigm religious figure. In that case, it's
no wonder that liberal society can't really accommodate such
people.
Reader: You don't seem to think that liberalism is capable
of tolerating true religion. But that's the whole point of liberalism, I would think. Isn't liberalism based on tolerance even of
radically different views?
Stanley: Another canard. As I've said, liberal theory cannot
tolerate real religion. Religions are not tolerant; that's why they
are religions and not philosophical systems. ... Religious claims
do not . . . respect any line between the private and the public.
That is why liberalism cannot tolerate them; they violate its religion of tolerance. . . . (p. 297)
Reader: If liberal theory cannot define the limits of tolerance, how is the line to be drawn? Who is to judge?
Stanley: Who is to judge? How about the people whose job it
is to judge-judges, administrators, mayors, governors, college
presidents-all of those who by virtue of the positions they occupy
have been assigned, and have accepted, the task of making decisions even when the lines are not perfectly clear and they are less
than infallible. (p. 91)
Reader: You yourself are one of those people, a college
administrator. What do you think about campus speech codes?
Stanley: Liberals view hate speech as irrational and therefore a problem to be cured. This is wrong. If you think of hate
speech as evidence of moral or cognitive confusion, you will try to
clean the confusion up by the application of good reasons; but if
you think that hate speakers, rather than being confused, are simply wrong-they reason well enough but their reasons are anchored in beliefs ... you abhor- you will not place your faith in
argument but look for something stronger. (p. 71)
Reader: So you don't think education or dialogue would
help? These people are just "bad to the bone"?
Stanley: The real question is strategic. Speech codes are a
possible strategy. You can ask if in this situation, at this time and
in this place, it would be reasonable to deploy them in the service
of your agenda (which, again, is not to eliminate racism but to
harass and discomfort racists). (pp. 71-72)
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Reader: You seem inclined to personalize conflicts, with

one side incorporating good and the other, to be fought to death,
incorporating evil. It's not racism which is the enemy, but individual bad people. No wonder you are so angry at those who
disagree with you ... Actually, I'm still puzzled by the degree of
your passion about issues of legal theory. Didn't you say earlier
that it was your view that theory doesn't matter, outside of the
confines of theory itself?
Stanley: "Why am I so vehement about putting theory in its
place?" .... The answer I would give is a political, not a theoretical one. Although the vocabulary of liberal theory is incoherent
and empty (unless filled by the substantive judgments it pushes
away) and cannot do the work (of clarifying, ordering, illuminating) claimed for it, it can nevertheless do work; and sometimes
that work is, according to my lights, bad. (pp. 290-91)
Reader: Sorry, I'm not sure I get that. Just what is the bad
work that liberalism is supposed to do, and which you are battling against?
Stanley: Liberalism frames issues in the wrong way. [T]he
point of the theoretical terms that make up strong liberalism-justice, fairness, impartiality, mutual respect, autonomy, and on and
on-is to de-emphasize historical considerations in favor of the
abstract moral considerations that should always apply, no matter
what the configuration and hierarchies of social and political
forces. (p. 291) The eye is deflected away from the whole-history, culture, habitats, society-and the parts, now freed from any
stabilizing context, can be described in any way one likes. (p.
312)
Reader (aside): I'm not sure what to make of this apparent
demand for contextuality and pragmatism. It seems to fly in the
face of the whole tone of the The Trouble With Principle, whose
critique of liberalism is relentlessly abstract and ahistorical.
Maybe inconsistency is a failing too common to be considered a
major flaw. Yet his relentless anger at theory does seem at odds
with his general belief in its irrelevance, something that is surely
worth further probing.
Reader: So your view, then, is that liberalism is deceptive?
It persuades people to look at current employment practices like
affirmative action without remembering the history of race in
this society. (pp. 6-7) Why is it successful in its deception?
Stanley: But why is the sleight of hand successful?, you ask.
Why don't more people see through it? Because it is performed
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with the vocabulary of America's civil religion-the vocabulary of
equal opportunity, color-blindness, race neutrality, and, above all,
individual rights. (p. 312)
Reader: It seems that you've taken quite a battle upon
yourself, doesn't it-Stanley versus the whole of the American
civic religion? Is it really possible to change such widespread
beliefs through argument?
Stanley: Unclear. Sometimes I don't think so: It is simply
too late in the day to go back. ... As someone once said, "Wealready had the Enlightenment and religion lost. " The loss is not
simply a matter of historical fact; it is inscribed in the very consciousness of those who live in its wake. That is why we see the
spectacle of men . . . . who set out to restore the priority of the
good over the right but find the protocols of the right-of liberal
proceduralism-written in the fleshly tables of their hearts. (p.
262) Even those who should be most at odds with the Enlightenment seem powerless to resist its spell.
Reader: That bit about "the fleshly tables of their hearts" is
very neat, by the way. I'll bet if I were more erudite I would
recognize it as a quotation, so it's doubly effective. Not only is it
a great metaphor, but it puts the reader on the cultural defensive. The bottom line, though, is your rejection of autonomy.
Apparently, you don't think people have much control over their
beliefs, if you view those beliefs as inscribed in their very flesh.
Stanley: Autonomy, another liberal watchword, is a mirage.
If autonomy is compromised by the shaping force of culture, and
if consciousness cannot exist without having a shape it did not
choose, and if our exposure to shaping forces increases as we get
older, then what adulthood and maturity bring is not more but less
autonomy, and not less but more indoctrination. (p. 160) Freedom of thought is a nice slogan, but it doesn't survive rigorous
analysis.
Reader: There doesn't seem to be much room for freedom
of any kind in your vision of the world. It's admirable that
you're able to battle on with such a fundamentally grim perspective on life.
Stanley: The bottom line conclusion is that freedom has always and already been lost. (p. 159)
Reader: Already lost, eh? Just like paradise?
Stanley: Exactly.
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The two fall silent. The reading light is turned out, and
"Stanley" disappears into the same darkness as the "Reader."

